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Abstract. The general picture about Somló’s Juristische Grundlehre is, that it is the continental version of John 
Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, or even more harshly, the ‘carbon-copy’ of it. The paper 
attempts to show that this picture is misleading and oversimplified. Somló developed further his master’s theory in 
important points, and in very creative ways. Three fields, or building blocks have been selected for illustrating this 
thesis. 1. The place, role, methodology, and use(fulness) of the jurisprudence in general, and its place within the 
system of legal sciences. 2. The definition of norm in general, (as genus proximum of the law), and the relationship 
between different norm-types. 3. The concept and the distinctive features of law.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As it is widely known Somló built his ‘Basic theory’ (‘Grundlehre’),1 to Austin’s analytical 
jurisprudence,2 and especially to his ‘command theory’. Radbruch, already in 1936 denoted 
Somló as the only follower of Austin in the Continent.3 Stanley Paulson, writing about 
Kelsen’s ‘two-fold classification’ of the legal theorists, – where Kelsen identifies Somló as 
an ‘empirico-positivist’ – marks Somló as a ‘continental carbon-copy’ of John Austin.4
This paper aims to demonstrate, that the relationship between Somló’s and Austin’s 
theory is far more complex than these evaluations might suggest. In general, I agree 
with Funke and Sólyom who are talking about ‘one-sided reception’, ‘controversial 
interpretations’ and ‘misunderstandings’ concerning the Grundlehre.5 My claim is, that 
Somló, in certain points developed further the Austinian theory in a very creative way; and 
in other points he entirely diverted from his master’s framework. This paper therefore 
attempts to dig deeper into the two authors’ intellectual relationship. The method I will be 
using that I selected three common topics, ‘building blocks’ of their theories, where I can 
demonstrate that Somló’s book is a lot more than the simple ‘carbon copy’ of Austin.
These three building blocks are the following: 1. The place, role, methodology, and 
use(fulness) of their theory, and jurisprudence in general within the system of legal sciences. 
2. The definition of norm in general, (as genus proximum of the law), and the relationship 
between different norm-types. 3. The concept and the distinctive features of the law.
I know, that many other fields would have been selected, (like the Sovereign 
– Rechtsmacht parallel, or the construction of basic rights, – see Szabó’s article6 in this 
issue, – or the theory of judicial interpretation, the role of judge-made law, and so on). 
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157FELIX SOMLÓ AND JOHN AUSTIN – BUILDING BLOCKS OF TWO ANALYTICAL THEORIES
So, from a certain respect these three topics seem to be randomly selected. I have two 
simple explanations for dealing with these: the first is the boundaries of such an article. The 
second, that all of the tree is demonstrating their basic attitude towards the law. None of the 
fields will be explicated exhaustively – only some important similarities, and differences 
will be examined.
The two authors are divided by three generations, and their respective works by more 
than 80 years. In contrary to the parallel that has been drawn between Somló and Hohfeld7 
in this issue the life of Austin and Somló show few similarities. Austin was a practitioner, 
and had a propensity for the military. Somló was an academic, inclined towards sociology, 
humanities and abstract thinking. Austin was active on the peak of the Commonwealth, 
while Somló wrote his magnum opus during the World War, in a collapsing Europe and 
Habsburg Empire. Therefore I think the whole context of their theory – for example 
‘command’, or ‘habit of obedience’ as a central category – is different. For Austin the 
‘Sovereign’ was a strong gravitational point within the Commonwealth, while for Somló 
‘Rechtsmacht’ was the only stable point in an uncertain world. From methodological point 
of view, Austin was a utilitarian, Somló was Neo-Kantian. Interestingly thought, besides the 
conceptual toolbox, there is one point which connects the two authors: for both of them 
the role model was the German jurisprudence. As it is known from his wife, Austin once 
sighed, that he wanted to be a ‘german professor’. Somló’s main intention was also to 
impress his German academic contemporaries.
The methodology of this paper is analytical. I will compare the texts, the concepts and 
reasoning within the texts, and – wherever it is needed – the meta-texts (i.e. the source 
texts, or texts that has been inspired by the works of Austin and Somló). So, except the 
paragraph above, I will not be dealing with the social and historical context of the two 
theories.
2. METHODOLOGY AND THE ROLE OF ‘GENERAL LEGAL SCIENCE’
Both Austin and Somló developed a general theory of law (‘philosophy of positive law’, 
and ‘Grundlehre’). For a contemporary reader it could seem that these theories are somehow 
mixtures of the ‘real’ philosophy of law, and the doctrinal scholarship. For those who knew 
the theoretical scene of the mid 19th English, and early 20th century in Germany is obvious, 
that these theories were born both against natural law, and at the same time had an ambition 
to be the ‘general part’ of, or ‘introductory exercise’ to the study of legal sciences, and in a 
certain respect had also the ambition to be the real, or ‘pure’ legal science itself. The 
discipline, which – based on philosophical, and exact conceptual foundations – describes 
the ‘anatomy’ of modern law. But apart from this self-portrait, the two author’s approach to 
the discipline is totally different, and not only because there is an 80 year, and a whole legal 
culture gap between them, but also because the place of their system within the broader 
picture, the methodology of this discipline, the ultimate goal and the ‘target group’ of their 
effort is also radically different.
Austin does not have long methodological foundations in his book in the modern 
sense: he follow his master’s, Bentham’s path. As Crimmins notes Bentham argued that 
‘legal science ought to be built on the same immovable basis of sensation and experience as 
that of medicine’ Bentham denotes in one of his manuscript that ‘what the physician is to 
the natural body, the legislator is to the political: legislation is the art of medicine exercised 
7 Szabó (2018).
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upon a grand scale.’8 For Austin, the greater challenge was not methodological, rather 
finding the subject (‘the province’) of his study.
The only part, where Austin speaks about methodological questions, can be found in 
the Introduction, (‘Outline of the Course of Lectures’), and interestingly, he later has a 
rather lengthy observation in the 3rd lecture, where he deals not with the method of 
jurisprudence, but with methodological questions of the nearest neighbouring field: the 
science of legislation, or the science of ethics, or deontology. Though this is a very 
interesting part, here I will not reflect on this.9
Austin states as a starting point that ‘“the philosophy of positive law” indicates the 
most significantly the subject and scope’ of his course.10 As a beginning he differentiates 
between two types of jurisprudences: general jurisprudence, (or philosophy of positive law) 
and particular jurisprudence, or the science of positive law.11 Here Austin explicitly refers 
to Hugo, who was the founder of the ‘historische Rechtsschule’,12 as his role model, saying, 
that though Hugo uses to his own work the ‘law of nature’ term, this is not the ‘ususal 
meaning’, because it denotes the ‘philosophy of positive law’, which
is concerned directly with principles and distinctions, which are common to various 
systems of particular and positive law, and which each of those various systems 
inevitably involves. […] [it] is concerned with law as it is necessarily is, rather than 
with law as it ought to be.
This definition separates the general jurisprudence from three other disciplines: on one 
hand it is distinguished from those, that are dealing with particular legal systems. General 
jurisprudence is dealing with law in general. Second, it should be separated from those 
speculative sciences, that are not based on – we now might say – ‘empirical’ facts: this 
jurisprudence is not a natural law theory. E.C. Clarke, who was the Regius Professor of 
Civil Law in Cambridge at the end of the 19th century, in an article written in 1885 interprets 
the project of Austin that ‘(t)he most important result of confining Jurisprudence to Positive 
or actual law is to exclude from its province all rules not gathered from observation but 
deduced a priori from assumed first principles.’13 And thirdly, this science should be 
differentiated from those, that are dealing with what the law ought to be. This latter 
discipline is called by Austin the science of legislation, or ethics, (or deontology).
This discipline works through careful definition, explanation, clarification, and 
systematization of certain concepts: most of them can be traced back to some simple 
empirical notions. But what concerns its ultimate goal, I think Austin himself was not 
certain. On the one hand he surely had an ambition to follow the German professors, and 
  8 Bentham Manuscripts at University College London, box xxxii, page 168. Cited by Crimmins 
(2017).
  9 Here he remarks, that these sciences are ‘law and morality as they should be or ought to be’, 
(Austin1873: 127) a kind of ‘system of ideal law’ and they rest upon observation and induction. 
10 It is worth mentioning that Hugo was considered to be not only a strong promoter of the legal 
science, and lawyers central role within law, but Hannover was at that time a place where imperial 
‘institutional constitutionalism’ was flourishing. Imperial tradition will be an important motive both 
for Austin and Somló.
11 Austin (1873) 32.
12 Whitman (1990) 85.
13 Clark (1885) 201., emphasis added.
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build up a clear and nice scientific system. But he had another goal too: to educate, or at 
least influence the legal community, the practitioners. Firstly, the decision-makers, the 
politicians, pursuing the project of Austin’s great master, Bentham, the codification. ‘The 
study of general jurisprudence is a necessary […] preparative to the science of legislation 
[…] the study of general jurisprudence might precede or accompany with advantage the 
study of particular systems of positive law.’ – as Austin states in one point.14 In this respect 
Austin followed the tradition of the great English jurists, like Blackstone, who primarily 
wanted to provide practical help to the practitioners. Blackstone believed, like Austin, that 
system helps lawyers to be better lawyers – though it is unclear, how.
And, while Austin proved to be, at least partly, successful – though not in his life – in 
reaching the first goal, and was later admired by the academia, – and also partly successful 
in the second,15 he failed in the third. As it is well known Austin’s lectures were discontinued 
in 1835 because of the slight attendance.16
Somló – as he said – was impressed by Austins’s method, and accuracy and praises his 
‘sharpness and fineness of its dissection, its conscientiousness and strict consistency’,17 but 
in several points he is diverting from Austin both methodologically, both by his aim, and 
therefore – so to say – in genre of his book.
Austin’s great advantage is – he says, that he ‘[…] is the first to make the meaningful 
distinction between such necessary principles, without which one legal system cannot be 
thought at all, and others that are not necessary, so that a system of legal norms can be 
conceived even without them’, and without clarifying these concepts, any talk in law is 
uncertain. The problem is, as Somló puts it, that Austin himself was not consistent with this 
distinction, and often mixes necessary, unavoidable (unvermeidlich) concepts, like sovereign 
and right, with simply general (bloβ allgemeinen) ones, like the distinction of obligations ex 
contractu, ex delictu, or possession and property. Austin’s followers, the ‘analytical school’ 
(Holland, Clark, Hearn, Lightwood, Salmond) went on with that mistake. They all were 
inconsistent in bringing Austin’s distinction further, though here and there in certain points 
they realized important things. For example Holland rightly recognized, that the principles 
of jurisprudence can be recognized from one legal system, and does not require necessarily 
a comparative method. He also mentions Lightwood’s interesting distinction between ‘pure 
jurisprudence’ and ‘general jurisprudence’ where ‘pure’ would be something like Somló’s 
theory, but Lightwood – he says – makes a different mistake: he ‘stuffs’ his ‘pure’ theory 
with evaluation questions. Somló also analyses Salmond, Markby, Amos and John Chipman 
Gray: their theories are all defective, he says. They either mix up ‘necessary’ and ‘general’, 
14 Austin (1873) 33.
15 He served as a reference point or an authority, in different codification projects, see e.g. 
Diamond (1968) though sometimes in a very general context. See also: Wisdom (1939), Weiss (2000).
16 Szabó (2018) Rumble (1996) Even John Stuart Mill, who was a great admirer of Austin 
remarked, that he ‘might explain, what is meant by general jurisprudence: in what respect a course of 
jurisprudence differs from a course of lectures on the law of any particular country, & also from 
lectures on the science or art of legislation: the grounds of the opinion, that there really is a science of 
general jurisprudence, & that it is worth studying: proof of the perverting & confusing effect of the 
study of law as it is commonly pursued, without being accompanied by the study of jurisprudence: 
examples of the erroneous notions usually formed as to what jurisprudence is, & the silly talk of 
Blackstone, & others of our lawyers, when they erect the technical maxims of their own law into 
principles of jurisprudence’ Mill (1963) cited by Rumble(1996) 28.
17 Somló (1917) 35.
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‘necessary’ and ‘known by many legal systems’ concepts, or factual descriptions with 
evaluative elements. ‘Thus, from the point of view to be considered here, the analytic 
school has only the errors of Austin, not its advantages. The lack of a strict separation of the 
necessary and purely general concepts of law into two particular systems becomes 
disastrous for this school, and leads within it to the complete obscuration of Austin’s 
conception and to the misrecognition of its real significance for jurisprudence.’18
Somló’s starting point in building up his theory is not the ‘general’ vs ‘particular’, 
distinction, but those legal sciences that are dealing with the content of the law, versus those 
that are dealing with the form. (Rechtsinhaltswissenschaften versus Wissenschaft von der 
Rechtsform). He says, that while the material legal sciences are dealing with concepts that 
are describing the substance of the legal provisions, his theory is dealing with the pure 
form. While Austin’s theory is dealing with ‘principles and distinctions’ that are common to 
various systems of […] positive law; and which each of those various systems inevitably 
involves’,19 his Grundlehre is based on the concepts that are in connection with the form of 
the law, without which any legal system (legal state – Rechtszustand) unimaginable 
(undenkbar wäre). Now, jurisprudence – in the continental sense which is ‘doctrinal, or 
dogmatical science’ is exactly belonging to this group of ‘content’ sciences. We sometime 
call these sciences ‘positive legal sciences’ – (positive Rechtswissenschaften). They are 
dealing with a particular legal system or rather group of norms. Other legal content sciences 
are legal politics, and the science of legal history.
The secondary distinction Somló uses for differentiating his theory from other theories 
is based on the fact, that legal sciences are also belonging to the greater family of normative 
sciences. Normative sciences have two types. First, those, that are creating the norms – or 
rather ‘bringing them into the light’, like the ethics. These are the nomothetic sciences. 
Second, there are the types, that are describing the norms, and systematizing them. These 
are the nomographic sciences. Their primary goal is ‘further processing’ the given norm-
material.20
They do not have to find the norms, at least they do not have to do that exclusively, but 
always have to take what they have already given as their starting point, to interpret 
and systematize it.21
Somló, using these distinctions distinguishes his theory from the contemporary 
German legal theories: from Bergbohm’s, from Bierling’s from Kelsen’s and from Reinach’s 
theory. As Funke points out,22 besides Austin, for Somló Bierling’s Juristische Prinzi-
pienlehre was the primary work he built his theory on. The distinction he makes from 
Kelsen and Reinach is quite interesting, but now for my purpose it is more important, how 
he differentiates his theory from the other general legal theories. The main argument goes 
like this: though it seems, that these theories are all provide a kind of general ‘prerequisites’ 
of all legal systems, the method how they reach it is ill, because they do this in an inductive 
way. They all observe the existing legal systems, and generalize these observations: 
concepts go back to more general concepts, and finally to some important principles. But a 
18 Somló (1917) 37. 
19 Austin (1873) 32. 
20 Somló (1917) 22.
21 Somló (1917) 23.
22 Funke and Sólyom (2013), Funke (2018). 
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concept in this way will always remain a ‘legal-content’ concept. For unveiling the concepts 
of the legal form requires another method: we have to find those ones, without which a 
legal system is unimaginable. For example without marriage or even contract and property 
a legal system can be construed theoretically, no matter how unreasonable it would be. 
But a legal system where there is no addressee of the norm, or issuer of a norm, or there is 
no obligation, would not be a legal system at all. While the general content-concepts of the 
law are called by Bergbohm the ‘highest peaks’ on the building of the law, Somló remarks, 
that the ‘form-concepts’ are rather the ‘deepest foundations’.
For Somló the ultimate use of this Legal Form Science is, to give the definition of 
the law itself, which is a precondition, a prerequisite, a preliminary work, (Vorarbeit) for 
the positive legal sciences, without which they cannot even start developing their theories. 
‘The essence of law cannot be determined from the material of the positive law’– he 
remarks.
What connects the theory of Austin and Somló is the overestimation of the role of the 
theory, and especially the overestimation of the role of concept or definition of law. Time 
has not proven that the concept of law plays any role either in the ‘science’ of the positive 
law, or in the everyday functioning of the legislation or application of law. Law visibly 
needs no of these ‘preliminary work’ for an effective functioning.
Austin has three goals, and three target groups, (the academic community, the decision-
makers, and the practitioners). Anglo-saxon general theories, starting from the Doctor and 
Student to Blackstone’s Commentaries’ are all systematizations of the scattered and vague 
English law, and intended to be toolkits for the practitioners. That is why they extensively 
dealing with ‘content-concepts’, like the marriage, the property, or the difference between 
property and possession. This determines their target group: Blackstone never thought 
that anyone else than the practitioners, could be his readers. Bentham was a political 
philosopher, and his program of codification aimed the political elite too, and in this respect 
Austin’s theory is also aiming the politicians. ‘Mr. Austin is an enthusiastic Benthamite. 
His associations have been altogether with codes and systems.’ – notes George Sharshwood, 
the editor of the American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries.23 Austin’s personal 
tragedy that these practitioners had not found his theory practical enough in his life.
On the other side, – to put it very bluntly – the German theories, from Savigny through 
the Allgemeine Rechtslehre-s till Somló are rather summaries of the legal science. Therefore 
Somló has only one goal, and one target group. The goal is to make the preliminary work, 
on which basis the doctrinal legal sciences ‘can start their work’, and the target group is his 
peers, especially his German speaking fellow-professors of the time. Though he also 
prepared a summary of his book in Hungarian, and intended to use it as a textbook, the 
Grundlehre is still a preliminary work for the cultivation of any legal science and a relevant 
contribution to the Allgemeine Rechtslehre discourse of his time.
Gustav Radbruch developed a theory about the interconnection of the Continental and 
the English legal philosophy. In his 1936 article he states, that it is not only that the 
Continental legal theory had practically no effect on the English, but that its trend of 
development is just the opposite. ‘Even the name given in England to that highest peak 
of juristic abstraction which corresponds to Continental legal philosophy is not in 
accordance with Continental terminology,’24 since jurisprudence denotes in the Continent 
23 Sherswood (1893) xxi.
24 Radbruch (1936) 530.
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the totality of legal sciences, while in England more or less it is synonym with the legal 
theory. According to Radbruch Austin invented the Allgemeine Rechtslehre fifty years 
earlier than it formed in Germany. ‘What the Continent achieved only after long byways 
through historical and philosophical systems of many kinds, was suddenly created by Austin 
fifty years earlier’.25
Radbruch himself is reluctant, how these two theories are linked. While he says on one 
point that the analytical jurisprudence, and the Allgemeine Rechtslehre is the same, on the 
other part of the text he states, that the Austinian theory had very superficial, or no effect on 
the latter. Though according to Sarah Austin, her husband once sighed, that he must have 
been a German professor, and Austin himself refers to Hugo’s work as his greatest 
inspiration, in reality Austin’s work was influenced mainly by Bentham. Somló is the only 
counterexample: ‘(i)t is only Somló’s ‘Juristic Principles” where the influence of Austin in 
the Continent made itself felt.’26
Radbruch is wrong entirely in the first point, and partly wrong in the second. He is 
wrong in the statement that the Allgemeine Rechtslehre-s are delayed continental versions 
of the Austinian theory. The analytical school has no real connection to the Allgemeine 
Rechtslehre-s, these two theoretical streams of thought developed separately. He is partly 
right, that Somló was the only continental theorist who was inspired by the Austinian 
theory, but this inspiration was not methodological, it rather affected some important 
content (empirical) elements or foundations of his theory: primarily the idea that law is a 
command of the sovereign, and that sovereign is based on empirical facts, like habit of 
obedience.
3. THEORY OF NORMS;  
THE ROLE OF LAW WITHIN ALL KIND OF OTHER NORMS
We should agree with Funke, stating that ‘Somló and his followers conceived legal theory 
as a theory of legal norms’.27 Both in the ‘Province’ and in the ‘Grundlehre’ a relatively 
long text is devoted to place the law in the family of norms, or rules, or laws (improperly so 
called). For Austin, we might say that this is the centre of his work: to make a clear 
distinction between law and other types of rules.
Though Austin uses the concept of ‘ought’ when he mentions it, he does it in special 
contexts, always mentioning the principle of utility – that law and morality has something 
to comply with. ‘Ought’ never mentioned as a feature of law itself. He starts his lectures, by 
the distinction already laid down by one of his master, John Locke28 that there are ‘real’ 
laws, and laws, we call laws by the way of resemblance, ‘properly’ and ‘improperly’ so 
called,29 as he puts it.30 Laws properly so called are always commands of a superior to an 
inferior. Commands are acts of will, supported by sanction. There are two sub-categories 
within that. Within proper laws there are the laws of God, and the positive laws, set by 
human superiors to human inferiors.
25 Radbruch (1936) 530.
26 Radbruch (1936) 531. fn 3.
27 Funke (2018).
28 Austin (1873) 80.
29 Austin (1873) 80.
30 See also Rumble (1977) 80.
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Laws improperly so called are analogous to law proper: they are metaphorical or 
figurative expressions, where the custom, or usage inappropriately extends the meaning of a 
word to another. If this extension results a close ‘resemblance’, the extension will be an 
analogy, if it results a remote resemblance it will be called ‘figurative’. The previous is 
‘positive morality’, the latter are the ‘laws’ of nature, like the physical causation. Positive 
morality is a very broad category, and comprises all kinds of norms, that are ‘set and 
enforced by mere opinion’,31 like ‘the law of honour’, ‘the laws set by fashion’, and 
‘international law’ as well.
In this respect already Somló’s starting point is radically different: though he also 
distinguishes between the normality and the norm, and considers norms only in the latter 
sense, he makes explicit, that norm’s distinctive feature is, that it is ‘ought’ (Sollen)
If we now designate the concept of the norm as the generic concept of law, then this 
happens in the sense of an ought, that is to say in the so-called normative meaning of 
the word. Not the normal or the regular is meant to be designated in contrast to the 
abnormal, to the exceptional case, but the standard-compliant, the normative in contrast 
to the deviant.32
‘Ought’ is therefore the genus proximum of law. Before defining the law, Somló 
demonstrates this genus proximum, with elaborating a whole theory on norms which is 
called in Grundlehre ‘nomology’.
The nomology is built on two distinctions, that are unknown for Austin, but which 
plays very important role in Somló’s theory: the distinction of ‘absolute and empirical’ 
norms, and the distinction of ‘autonomous and heteronomous’ norms.
The first distinction has different meanings. First, absolute norms are the highest, self-
evident, non-traceable values of ethics, logic, and aesthetics, like the ‘nice’ and ‘good’, and 
religious norms. Second, while these norms are not created by human will, and cannot be 
changed by will, the empirical norms are those that are based on human will, rules issued 
by someone, by a distinctive issuer. Third, these rules, because they are created by will, at 
the same time they are ‘accidental’, or ‘random’ as Somló puts it.
Opposite them are the most random or empirical rules, rules which do not necessarily 
express the necessity of absolute values, and which are not called norms in the 
narrower sense of the word.33
These rules can be of many kinds. Customary rules, traditions, rules of conduct, the 
rules of games, the rules of the language (!) internal rules of companies and other 
organizations. It is important that purely based on the content of the norms they cannot be 
differentiated. It is only the issuer which makes the difference. Therefore in case of the law 
it is also the issuer – the Rechtsmacht – which will show, are we talking about law, or about 
other types of empirical rules.
Fourth Somló in other text-places identifies another separating criteria between 
absolute and empirical norms. Besides the ‘accidental – eternal’ and the ‘based on issuer 
31 Austin (1873) 89.
32 Somló (1917) 56.
33 Somló (1917) 59.
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(will) – not a will-based norm’ distinctions, he introduces the Kantian category of 
‘autonomous-heteronomous’ distinction stating, that ‘absolute norms’ are at the same time 
autonomous norms as well. This is the point where the two distinctions are connected to 
each other.
Originally, autonomous – heteronomous distinction is reflecting the Kantian idea, that 
there are rules that are requiring internal attitude, and norms that are requiring only an 
external alignment of actions – in the latter case we do not have to ‘believe’ in the rightness, 
we only have to follow the rule, for whatever reason. This, from a certain point of view is 
nothing else, but the distinction of ‘ethical’ and ‘legal’ norms.34 Law requires no internal 
attitude, only the alignment to its rules. But Somló uses this distinction in a slightly different 
sense: to differentiate between ‘external command’ and ‘internal promise’ a will-expression 
coming from outside, and an engagement which is one’s own will-expression, about her 
own future behaviour.
Though certain points these categories, and their different meanings sometimes cause 
internal tensions within the text, but in general it is a more sophisticated explanation, than 
Austin’s.
Finally, there is a great difference between the Austinian and the Somló’s theory in the 
use of the concept of validity claim (Geltungsanspruch) as a test to separate commands 
from other will-expressions.
Following his master Somló accepts, that legal norms are primarily commands. 
But there are other types of will expressions too: wishes, requests, etc. Sometimes these 
will-expressions are formulated in the same form: ‘bring me a glass of water’ can be a wish, 
(‘…if you want’), but can be a command. And it is not the sanction, which makes the 
difference. Here, Somló is using the concept of ‘validity claim’ in an entirely different way 
than Stammler, from whom he is borrowing it. At Stammler’s the validity claim, – the 
intention of the issuer – is primarily to distinguish law from conventional norms. Somló 
points out that Stammler is wrong in this respect. Validity claim is separating the commands 
from other will acts, and not the law from other norms. It separates the commands from 
wishes or requests. Command’s validity claim comprises that the addressee cannot deviate 
from it, and therefore it aims to be received. The paradox is, that neither the addressee’s 
consent, nor even their knowledge, nor the feasibility of the command is required for a 
valid command. A command is valid if it has a validity claim to be a command.
To sum up, in case of the type of norms, Somló entirely deviates from his master’s 
theory of norms. He uses the Kantian dichotomies of absolute and empirical, and 
autonomous and heteronomous and introduces the category of Neo-Kantian validity claim 
into his system. With this, he is representing a kind of transition between an entirely 
empirical and purely non-empirical theory (like Kelsen’s).
4. THE CONCEPT AND TYPES OF LAW
Austin’s definition for the law is very simple. Laws (properly so called) are general 
commands, given or set by political superiors, or by the sovereign for the members of the 
independent political community, and in case of non-compliance supported by some evil, 
34 Here is the point where Somló introduces the ‘nomology’ term. We are informed, that he 
borrowed the term from Holland, (Elements of jurisprudence). ‘Nomology […] may be defined as the 
science of the totality of the laws for which an external legislation is possible’ – emphasis added 
Z. Zs).
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which is sometimes called sanction. All of these elements have an importance, because if 
one is missing the norm will fall to another domain. For example, if the command in not 
general it will be an individual command. If the command is not set by a political superior, 
(like a master’s command to the servant) it will be an ‘improper’ law, if it is not an explicit 
command it will be a sentiment, falling into the domain of positive morality, and so on. 
If no evil is connected, (as Austin puts it ‘annexed’) to the command, the norm will be for 
example the law of God. Moreover the sanction generates the duty, which on the other side 
generates the right.
Somló’s norm-typology is a lot more sophisticated, as I showed in part 2. Somló 
introduced three new elements into the typology of norms, 1. ‘Ought’ as a distinctive feature 
of norms 2. the ‘absolute – empirical’ and the ‘autonomous – heteronomous’ distinction, 
and he used 3. the ‘validity claim’ (‘Geltungsanspruch’) for differentiating between 
commands and other types of will-expressions.
This theoretical framework enables Somló to introduce three creative innovations to 
Austin’s theory. 1. laws can be not only commands but promises, (based on the autonomous 
and heteronomous distinction), and therefore he introduces the idea of promissory law, 
2. sanction is not a necessary element of the law, and therefore sanction is not a distinctive 
feature of law, because the different types of commands and promises are differentiated 
from other will-expressions by the validity claim, and not the sanction, and finally 3. law is 
necessarily a system of rules, regulating a relatively wide circle of life-relations. I will deal 
from these innovations with two in detail.
1. (Promissory law) According to Somló it is not only the command (a heteronomous 
will-expression), but the promise (an autonomous will-expression) of the sovereign can 
establish law. The idea, that promise can also be the basis of law is not Somló’s ‘invention’. 
The idea of ‘own-obliged sovereign’ was the integral part of the German legal science of 
the time. Somló extensively explicates the literature of promissory law, (§ 70: ‘Zur Literatur 
des Begriffes des Versprechensrecht’35). Here his concept lays on two foundations. The first 
is, that he relies on the rich German tradition in legal science: Jhering’s ‘one-sided binding’, 
and ‘two-sided binding norms’, Bierling’s ‘contractual norms’, and Jellinek’s ‘state bound 
by law’, which either from private law point of view, or more frequently from public law 
point of view analyse promise’s role in law. In private law it creates the basis of contracts, 
and generates the obligations, in public law the promises of the state have an ‘assurance’ 
function.
The second intellectual stream on which Somló’s promissory law concept rests is 
Adolf Reinach’s Apriorische Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts. This theory is considered 
to be a kind of forerunner of the speech act theory. In this work Reinach states, that 
‘promising belongs to a special group of acts which create social realities that are as real as 
house or trees. […] [W]e can oblige ourselves and this obligation is not a mere feeling or 
convention, but a reality to which we can refer’.36
The promissory law enables Somló to explain in a very elegant way a whole range of 
concepts: the concept of constitutional law, the differences between branches of law, or the 
phenomenon of lex imperfecta. He further colours his system by introducing the concept of 
primary and secondary commands. Legal power can issue primary and secondary commands 
– he says. It can command to perform a duty towards itself, but it can command to perform 
35 Somló (1917) 208–13.
36 Loidolt (2016) 50.
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the duty towards a third party. And a promise can be issued to this third party that the state 
will enforce the command. Further, commands and promises can be issued independently, 
or in connection with one another. When two parties contract, the state implicitly commands 
the obligor to perform the duty for the obligee, but at the same time issues a promise 
towards the obligee, that the duty will be enforced. In the case of lex imperfecta, which is 
often said to be a sanctionless norm, – and in the constitutional law this is true, – in civil 
law it is a primary and a secondary command without a promise that it will be enforced.
2. (The law as a system) Somló’s second important innovation is the idea, that law can 
be only postulated as a system of rules. This not only means, that law’s rules are 
interconnected, and form a system, but that he law should comprise, regulate a wide area of 
life relations.
Sovereign is not yet adequately characterized by the fact that it is a power that is 
usually able to enforce its norms in a particular group of people, and thus more 
successfully than other factors. The norms of a power which addressed only a very 
small number of norms to its subordinates did not become a legal power, even if it 
were able to enforce those norms in the same way as explained above. It also requires 
that it directs numerous norms to its subordinates and powerfully grasps a wide range 
of living conditions in positive regulation.37
This idea comes back in the book in several forms. Funke and Sólyom rightly 
recognized this peculiarity of Somló’s theory as one of his main achievement.38 The legal 
system, is a ‘conceptual multum tantum’ as Somló puts it, devoting a whole part in his book 
to justify this statement. Here he says, that
[T]he concept of legal power developed here implies that, a legal norm as an isolated 
entity, without at the same time belonging to a multitude of sisters, is not existing. 
The fact that a power must normatively take on a wide range of living conditions in 
order to become a legal power, already contains the realization that there can not be a 
legal norm for itself, but in reality these always only can appear as a conceptual plural 
or rather multum tantum.39
If there is no multiple laws ranging to a relatively wide scope of the subordinates’ 
relations, there is no sovereign (legal power) and there is no law. This is a strange 
requirement, because it shows, that the systematic feature of law, (or at least a set of rules 
covering a wide area in life) is not only the conceptual element of law, but primarily the 
precondition of the legal power. Somló uses this idea not only to define the Rechtsmacht, 
but this element will be the basis of the explanation of the international law. (Völkerrecht) 
Somló says, that ‘normally’ the explanation is, (and this is Austin’s explanation either) there 
is no higher power within the international community, and there are no subordinate states. 
This is not true, says Somló, following Lawrence,40 because the primacy of the Great 
Powers in Europe, a body of representatives of Great Powers is a de facto sovereign 
within the international community, which can also impose sanctions on other states. 
37 Somló (1917) 97.
38 Funke and Sólyom (2013) and Funke (2018).
39 Somló (1917) 98.
40 Lawrence (1895) 65.
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So, international law from this viewpoint could be a law. The primary problem is with the 
scarcity (Spärlichkeit) of the rules:
In relation to the immense field of state activity, it is only a relatively narrow circle in 
which the norms of international law are moving. They capture only a small portion of 
the living conditions of their addressees.41
and
a large part of the so-called International law is not only non-legal norm, but no norms 
at all, but only possibilities for free action, dependent on the consent of the addressee, 
pious wishes, advice, etc.42
Two other problem is the weakness, the impermanence (Unbeständigkeit) of the legal 
power, and finally the insufficient following (compliance) (unzureichende Befolgung) of the 
international law. So international law is definitely not a positive morality, but not a law as 
well. It is something of its own, very close to the conventional norms.
For Somló all other distinctions, like, the ones enlisted in § 2043 is (special and general, 
sanctioned and sanction less) are less important from this viewpoint. This is an important 
difference to Austin since for Austin,44 referring to Bentham both, the generality and the 
sanction are distinctive features of the law. He says, that what distinguishes a particular 
command from a general one, is that it is generally obliging group of persons, and general 
that it is describing classes of acts. Also, legal norm’s distinctive feature is that it is attached 
to an ‘evil’, a sanction. Here it is worth for remark, that Somló, in other places differentiated 
between primary and secondary norms. Funke, however points out that these distinction 
is not similar to Hart’s, because Somló uses this these distinctions in the sense, that the 
first is set ‘directly set by the highest power’, while the secondary is ‘set by the power of 
another, subordinate to it.’
This concept has a serious impact on the concept of the Sovereign as well. Namely, 
that it is not only the general obedience which is the precondition of the sovereign, (and the 
independent political community) but that the Sovereign should regulate via the law 
a relatively wide circle of life-relations.
5. SUMMARY
Somló did not copy, rather adapted the Austinian theory. He used Austin’s concept of 
sovereign and command to conceptualize the law, but he developed this concept in many 
points. First, his theory was more intended to be a contribution to the legal science, than a 
manual for practitioners, as Austin’s. Second, he used Kantian and Neo-Kantian concepts, 
and ideas of the contemporary German legal science in order to keep distance from Austin’s 
empirical foundations. Third, this new conceptual framework enabled him to explain the 
structure of modern law on a more profound way. With the concept of promissory law, or 
the systematic character of law he is an important forerunner of the twentieth century legal 
theory.
41 Somló (1917) 160.
42 Somló (1917) 161.
43 Somló (1917) 64–65.
44 Austin (1873) 97.
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